Real Estate Joint Venture Interests as Securities: The Implications of Williamson v. Tucker by Morgenstern, Marc H.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 59 Issue 4 
1982 
Real Estate Joint Venture Interests as Securities: The Implications 
of Williamson v. Tucker 
Marc H. Morgenstern 
Kahn, Kleinman, Yanowitz & Arnson Co., LPA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Marc H. Morgenstern, Real Estate Joint Venture Interests as Securities: The Implications of Williamson v. 
Tucker, 59 WASH. U. L. Q. 1231 (1982). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
REAL ESTATE JOINT VENTURE INTERESTS
AS SECURITIES: THE IMPLICATIONS
OF WILLIAMSON V. TUCKER
MARC H. MORGENSTERN*
Whether interests in real estate transactions are securities is an in-
triguing and continually recurring issue. Such transactions rarely are
structured in conventional corporate form, and, consequently, interests
in real estate seldom bear recognizable security labels such as "stocks"
or "bonds." As one commentator has noted, "substance governs rather
than form. . . . [J]ust as some things which look like real estate are
securities, some things which look like securities are real estate."'
Judicial examination of real estate interests as securities typically re-
quires an analysis of whether they are "investment contracts,"2 one of
the defined terms for a security under the federal securities laws.' The
scope of investment contract analysis is expansive, and under its aegis,
courts have found securities in surprising contexts, from investments in
scotch whiskey casks,4 to earthworm farms,5 to discretionary commodi-
ties accounts.6 Courts are repeatedly called upon to determine "which
of the myriad financial transactions in our society come within the cov-
* Principal, Kahn, Kleinman, Yanowitz & Arnson Co., L.P.A., Cleveland, Ohio. B.A.,
1972, Yale University; J.D., 1975, Boston University. The author thanks Thomas Collin, Karl
May, Pat Morgenstern-Clarren, and Peter Rubin for their helpful comments.
1. L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 493 (2d ed. 1961).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(l) 78c(a)(10) (1976).
3. See Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1976).
4. See, e.g., SEC v. Haffenden-Rimer Int'l, Inc., 496 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1974); SEC v. M.A.
Lundy Assocs., 362 F. Supp. 226 (D.R.I. 1973).
5. Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1979).
6. The federal appellate courts have not treated discretionary commodities accounts uni-
formly. See SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974) (discretionary
commodities account is a security); Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Constantino, 493 F.2d 1027
(2d Cir. 1974) (same). But see Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d
216 (6th Cir. 1980) (discretionary commodities account is not a security), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct.
1971 (1981); Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978) (same); Milnarik v. M-S Com-
modities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972). See also Hodes &
Dreyfus, Discretionary Trading Accounts in Commodity Futures-Are 7hey Securities?, 30 PRAC.
LAW. 99 (1974); Comment, Discretionary Commodities Accounts as Securities, 67 GEO. L.J. 269
(1978).
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erage of [the federal securities] statutes.' 7
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Williamson v. Tucker8 recently
explicated the circumstances under which an interest in a real estate
joint venture9 constitutes an investment contract and thus a security.
The court also formulated a test for making such a determination. This
Article discusses the history of investment contract analysis, critically
examines the Williamson test, and suggests methods for joint venture
promoters and their counsel to respond to the test.
I. DEFINITION OF A SECURITY
Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines a security as "any
note,. . . evidence of indebtedness,. . investment contract, . . or, in
general any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security.' "10
The definition of a security in section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 1 is identical in operative effect to that contained in
the Securities Act of 1933, and for this purpose the two acts are to be
construed in pari materia.12
The definition of a security for state law purposes is substantially the
7. United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975).
8. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981).
9. A joint venture is commonly defined as a partnership organized for a specific project, or
more generally as a "form of partnership." Long, Partnershp, Limited Partnershop, and Joint Ven-
ture Interests as Securities, 37 Mo. L. REv. 581, 587 (1972). There are technical differences be-
tween the two forms of entities. The Uniform Partnership Act has been adopted, with some
revisions, in all states and delineates the respective rights and obligations of partners in a partner-
ship. There is no statutory counterpart, however, for joint venture partners. Among the more
important differences to the practitioner between a general partnership and a joint venture is that
a partner has the right contractually to bind the partnership, while a joint venture partner has no
such right absent specific authorization in the joint venture agreement.
While these differences may be of practical interest in choosing an entity form, they do not
necessitate separate analytical treatment when determining the existence of a security. From a
conceptual standpoint, whether an agreement is denominated a general partnership or a joint
venture is irrelevant, because both are subject to the same investment contract analysis. Most
courts have agreed that interests in joint ventures and general partnerships may be securities
under appropriate factual circumstances. This Article, therefore, draws no distinction between the
analysis of a joint venture or general partnership interest.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1976) (emphasis added).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976).
12. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). The term "security" is defined in the
following federal securities statutes: Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976); Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976); Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, § 2(a)(16), 15 U.S.C. § 79b(a)(16) (1976); Investment Company Act of
1940, § 2(a)(35), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(35) (1976); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 202(a)(17), 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(17) (1976). The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 303(17), 15 U.S.C. § 77ccc(l)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/7
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same as the federal definitions. The Uniform Securities Act' 3 defines a
security as "any note; stock; treasury stock; bond; debenture; evidence
of indebtedness;. . investment contract;. . or, in general, any inter-
est or instrument commonly known as a 'security.' "14
Neither the federal nor the state definitions of a security expressly
include joint venture interests.15 Such interests are securities when they
fall within the elastic category of investment contracts. 16 Investment
(1976), adopted the same definition as the Securities Act of 1933. There are some differences
among these statutory definitions, but none that affect this Article.
For an analysis of the different definitions of the term "security" in the Securities Act of 1933,
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, and the Investment
Company Act of 1940, see Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in
Defning Federal Securities, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 219, 221 & n.13 (1974).
13. The Uniform Securities Act has been adopted in whole or in part in 36 states, the District
of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and Guam.
14. UNIFORM SEcuRTrriEs ACT § 401(A) (emphasis added).
The Uniform Act also includes in its definition of securities "any contract or bond for the sale of
any interest in real estate or deferred payments or on installment plans when such real estate is not
situated in this state or in any state adjoining this state." Id This aspect of state regulation of
interests in foreign real estate as securities will not be addressed in this Article.
15. The American Law Institute Federal Securities Code Project also does not define a joint
venture interest as a security. Professor Loss, the Reporter of the Code, indicates that the statu-
tory definition should not be substantially changed because "there is now a considerable body of
jurisprudence and because it [the statutory definition] was substantially followed in the Uniform
Securities Act, so that there is also a degree of uniformity at both state and federal levels." ALI,
FED. SEC. CODE § 202(150), Comment I, at 198 (Official Draft 1980).
Section 202(150) of the proposed Code defines a security as follows:
(a) General.----"Security" means a bond, debenture, note, evidence of indebtedness,
share in a company (whether or not transferable or denominated "stock"), preorganiza-
tion certificate or subscription, investment contract, certificate of interest or participation
in a profit-sharing agreement, collateral trust certificate, equipment trust certificate (in-
cluding a conditional sale contract or similar interest or instrument serving the same
purpose), voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, or fractional undi-
vided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or in general, an interest or instrument
commonly considered to be a "security", or a certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to sub-
scribe to or buy or sell, any of the foregoing.
Id (emphasis added).
16. Numerous commentators have explored the parameters of investment contracts as securi-
ties. See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security" Is There a More Meaningful Formula?,
18 W. REs. L. REv. 367 (1967); Faust, What IsA Security? How Elastic Is The Definition?, 3 SEC.
REG. L.. 219 (1975); Hannan & Thomas, supra note 12; Long, An Attempt to Return 'Investment
Contracts'to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 135 (1971); Long, Intro-
duction to Symposiun Interpreting the Statutory Dinition ofa Security: Some Pragmatic Consid-
erations, 6 ST. MARY L.J. 96 (1974); Long, supra note 9; Marx, What IsA Securiy?, 35 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 757 (1978); Mofsky, The Expanding Definition of 'Securi y' Under the Blue Sky Laws,
I SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1973); Rapp, The Role of Promotional Characteristics in Determining the Exist-
ence of a Security, 9 SEc. REo. L.J. 26 (1981); Comment, Franchise Sales: Are They Sales or
Washington University Open Scholarship
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contract analysis evolved from a series of key decisions, including SEC
v. C. Joiner Leasing Corp., 7 SEC v. W.J Howey Co., 8 Commis-
sioner v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc. ,19 and United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman.20 An understanding of the implications of Williamson
first requires a review of these cases.2'
II. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT
A. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.
The first of the investment contract cases was Joiner."2 An oil dril-
ling firm, Joiner Company, offered assignments of oil leases to numer-
ous small investors. The sales literature23 emphasized that Joiner
Company was drilling a test well, the purpose of which was "to test the
Securities?, 34 ALB. L. REv. 383 (1970); Note, The Expanding Defiition of 'Security: Sale-
Leasebacks and Other Commercial Leasing Arrangements, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1221.
17. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
18. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
19. 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
20. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
21. In addition to Joiner, Howey, and UnitedHousing, the Supreme Court has also construed
the term "investment contract" in several cases. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551 (1979) (noncontributory pension plan was not a security within the meaning of the
federal securities acts); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) (withdrawable capital shares of
a savings and loan association were securities under the Exchange Act); SEC v. United Benefit
Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967) (flexible fund annuity contracts were securities within the mean-
ing of the Securities Act); SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959)
(variable annuity contracts were securities within the meaning of the Securities Act).
For critical evaluations of Daniel, see Della Rosa, Securities Law-Applicabiliy of the Securities
Act to Noncontributory, Compulsory Pension Plans-International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 159 (1980); Joseph, Securities Regulation: Implications of the
Daniel Decision--Involuntary, Noncontributory Pension Plans are not Securities, 32 OKLA. L. REV.
935 (1979). The Seventh Circuit's opinion was also discussed in Barasch, Interestsin Pension Plans
as Securities: Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 78 COLUM. L. Rnv. 184 (1978);
Emery & Heinzerling, FederalSecurities Laws: Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
11 AKRON L. Rnv. 578 (1978); Note, The Federal Securities Laws and Employee Pension Partici-
pants: Retiring Daniel, 87 YALE L.J. 1666 (1978).
22. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Co., 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
23. The following statement appeared on the circulars and selling letters:
Because these securities are believed exempted from registration, they have not been
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission; but such exemption, if avail-
able, does not indicate that the Securities have been either approved or disapproved by
the Commission or that the Commission has considered the accuracy or completeness of
the statements in this communication.
Id at 347 n.3.
The Supreme Court, however, gave little consideration in its analysis to whether the assign-
ments were securities to the promoters' own characterization of such interests as securities. 320
U.S. 344 passim.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/7
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oil-producing possibilities of the offered leaseholds." 24 The literature
also emphasized the investment character of the purchase and the op-
portunity afforded the investor to participate in an "enterprise. ' 25
In holding that the assignments were investment contracts, the
Supreme Court announced several standards that formed the basis for
later investment contract analysis. First, the method by which an offer
to sell an interest is communicated may play an important role in deter-
mining whether the interest is a security.26 Second, the name that the
interest bears is a starting point for analyzing whether the interest is a
security, but the name, by itself, is not dispositive. 27 Finally, although
the concept is implicit rather than explicit, "participation in an enter-
prise" 21 is a prerequisite to the existence of an investment contract.
The Joiner Company's drilling of the test well provided a common
enterprise between the seller and buyer of the assignments. The explo-
ration was an integral part of the value of the leasehold interests, and
the agreement to drill the well "[ran] through the whole transaction as
the thread on which everyone's beads were strung. ' 29 The exploration
provided the inducement to invest, because a successful test for oil
could cause the land to appreciate in value and permit the investors to
make a profit.
24. Id at 346.
25. Id
26. "[Djefendants were not, as a practical matter, offering naked leasehold rights. Had the
offer mailed by defendants omitted the economic inducements of the proposed and promised ex-
ploration well, it would have been a quite different proposition." Id. at 348.
For a thorough discussion of the importance of the manner of the offer in determining the
existence of a security, see generally Rapp, supra note 16.
27. The Court stated:
In the Securities Act the term "security" was defined to include by name or description
many documents in which there is common trading for speculation or investment.
Some, such as notes, bonds, and stocks, are pretty much standardized and the name
alone carries well settled meaning. Others are of more variable character and were nec-
essarily designated by more descriptive terms such as "transferable share," "investment
contract," and "in general any instrument commonly known as a security"... . Instru-
ments may be included within any of these definitions, as a matter of law, if on their face
they answer to the name or description. However, the reach of the Act does not stop
with the obvious and commonplace. Novel, uncommon or irregular devices, whatever
they appear to be, are also reached if it be proved as a matter of fact that they were
widely offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which established their char-
acter in commerce as "investment contracts," or as "any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a 'security."'
320 U.S. at 351.
28. Id at 346.
29. Id at 348.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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B. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.
The broad analytic principles articulated in Joiner were refined in
Howey. 30  The W.J. Howey Company offered to sell land in a citrus
grove development and its affiliate, Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc.,
offered to manage, cultivate, and market the crops and to remit the
proceeds to investors. The company offered each potential investor
both a land sales contract and a service contract and advised investors
that it was not feasible to invest in a grove unless a service arrangement
was made.
The Supreme Court relied heavily on federal and state32 judicial in-
terpretation of the term "investment contract"and held that four ele-
ments predicate the existence of an investment contract: (1) an
investment; (2) a common enterprise; (3) the expectation of profits;
and (4) profits that result solely from efforts of another.33 This formu-
lation is referred to as the Howey test, and subsequent decisions have
subjected virtually every constituent clause and word of the test to judi-
cial interpretation and modification.34
30. SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
31. Id at 295.
32. The author of the Iowey opinion, Justice Murphy, stated that he relied heavily on state
court interpretation of the term "investment contract" in formulating the test. Some commenta-
tors have suggested that at least a portion of the Howey opinion, however, was created from whole
cloth:
There is considerable support for the view that "solely" did not spring from prior
judicial precedent. None of the state cases cited in Justice Murphy's opinion even use
the word. Indeed, State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., apparently the principal source of
Murphy's definition, placed no such limitation on investment contracts. An investment
contract was there held to mean a contract or scheme for "placing of capital or laying out
of money in a way intended to secure income or profits from its employment."
Hannan & Thomas, supra note 12, at 250.
33. The Court held that "an investment contract, for purposes of the Securities Act means a
contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is
led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party . 328 U.S. at
298-99.
It should be noted that the Court itself did not divide the test into constituent elements. Profes-
sor Loss apparently was the first commentator to do so. See L. Loss, supra note 1, at 491 (2d ed.
1961). The Jiiamson court also discusses the Howey test as a three-part test. This Article, how-
ever, treats the test as having four elements.
34. For a discussion of the meaning of "investment of money," see International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 559-61 (1979). For secondary examination of the first element
of the Howey test, see Long, An Attempt to Return 'n'estment Contracts' to the Mainstream of
Securities Regulation, supra note 16, at 161-62.
A divergence of judicial opinion has developed with respect to the concept of "common enter-
prise." One approach is to analyze the relationship between the investor and promoter, while the
other approach analyzes the relationships among the investors. The former is referred to as the
[Vol. 59:1231
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The Howey Company contended that the transaction was merely the
sale of a fee simple interest in land, an interest clearly not a security. It
argued that the sale of land was completely distinct from the service
contract. The Court disagreed, however, and held that the investors
were actually offered an opportunity "to contribute money and to share
in the profits of a large citrus fruit enterprise managed and partly
owned by respondents. '35 This arrangement made the investors depen-
dent on the managerial services of the service company to secure prof-
its, and the interests were therefore investment contracts.
36
Although the Court stated that the investors were dependent upon
management by the service company, some investors did not enter into
a separate service contract,3 7 indicating that they thought they could
manage their interest without the service company. The potential im-
portance of this fact was minimized by the Court, which addressed the
issue of the independent investors by noting that the Securities Act pro-
hibits the offer as well as the sale of unregistered, nonexempt securities.
"Hence, it is enough that the respondents merely oer the essential in-
gredients of an investment contract."38
vertical approach, while the latter is referred to as the horizontal approach. The horizontal ap-
proach has been adopted by the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits. See Curran v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981);
Milnaik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972);
Wasnowic v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 352 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. Pa. 1972), affd without opinion, 491
F.2d 752 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 994 (1974). The Fifth Circuit has championed the
vertical approach. See SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
Under the horizontal approach, Florida courts have held that more than a single investor is
required to constitute a common enterprise. Le Chateau Royal Corp. v. Pantaleo, 370 So. 2d 1155
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Brown v. Rairigh, 363 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). See also
Moreno, Discretionary 4ccounts, 32 U. MII L. REV. 401 (1978); 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 129
(1980).
For a discussion of the fourth element of the Howey test and the limitations of the word
"solely," see Hannan & Thomas, supra note 12, at 233-35, 249-52. See also note 39 infra.
35. 328 U.S. at 299.
36. The District Court in Howey noted that 51 purchasers acquired property from the Howey
Company during the time period that was examined in the litigation. Only 42, however, entered
into contracts with the service company. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 60 F. Supp. 440,441 (S.D. Fla.
1945). The Supreme Court decision inlHowey emphasized the inability of the investors to manage
their land interests by themselves. The trial court's opinion, however, makes it clear that, in fact,
almost 20% of the investors were able to manage, or cause to be managed, their interest in the
land. Id
37. 328 U.S. at 300.
38. Id at 301 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court apparently held that investors who
purchased land but did not enter into service contracts were offered a security but purchased a
nonsocurity. Investors who purchased land and entered into a service contract were offered, and
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In Howey the investment contract and service contract were separate
documents. A major focus of the Court's inquiry was whether there
were two separate transactions or merely a single, integrated transac-
tion effected by two documents. Inquiry into the integration of owner-
ship and management is frequently unnecessary in a real estate joint
venture agreement. Customarily, both the ownership rights and the
services to be performed with respect to joint venture property by each
joint venturer are delineated in the joint venture agreement. Existence
of a security under the Howey test, however, is unaffected by the
number of documents involved in a transaction. The critical inquiry
concerns the offeree's characteristics, particularly his ability to perform
the managerial services upon which the success of the enterprise will
depend, and the economic dependence and interrelationship between
the offeror and the offeree.
C. Commissioner v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.
The primary alternative to the Howey test is the "risk capital" test
enunciated by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in Hawaii Market.39 The
court chose not to follow Howey in construing the term investment con-
tract under state law. In determining whether a "Founder-Member
Purchasing Contract Agreement" was a security within the meaning of
the Hawaii Uniform Securities Act,' the court dismissed the Howey
purchased, a security. The distinction is that investors who either managed their land or caused it
to be managed actively participated in the making of profits. As a result of their active participa-
tion, they failed to meet the requirement that an investment contract exists only when the investor
anticipates profits solely from the efforts of another.
39. Commissioner v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
In addition to certain state courts' rejection of Howey, some federal courts have also deviated
from application of the Howey test. The Ninth Circuit held that "the word 'solely' should not be
read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition of an investment contract, but rather must be
construed realistically, so as to include within the definition those schemes which involve in sub-
stance, if not form, securities.' SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). See also SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d
473 (5th Cir. 1974); Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group, Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974); Nash &
Assocs. v. Lum's of Ohio, Inc., 484 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court in United Hous.
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), explicitly avoided ruling on this aspect of the
Howey definition. See notes 44-56 infra and accompanying text.
40. The Hawaii statute provides:
"Security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebt-
edness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-
trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, certificate of interest
in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
[Vol. 59:1231
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test as too mechanical to protect the investing public adequately. The
principal weakness of the Howey test, in the court's view, was its over-
emphasis on investor participation in the enterprise and the unduly re-
strictive requirement that the investors' expectations of profit must
derive solely from the efforts of another. Noting that the fundamental
policy of the securities laws is to afford broad protection to investors,
the court held that securities exist "even in those situations where an
investor is not inactive, but [instead] participates to a limited degree in
the operation of the business."'"
The Hawaii Market court adopted a "risk capital" test, which states
that an investment contract is created whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offerer;
(2) A portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the
enterprise;
(3) The furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's
promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding
that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, will
accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise; and
(4) The offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual
control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.42
Although each element of the risk capital test differs from its Howey
counterpart, the fourth element of the test represents a major departure
from the Howey formula. Rather than focusing on whether the inves-
tor reasonably expects to make profits based solely on the efforts of
others, the risk capital test looks to the quality, not the quantity, of the
investor's participation in and control over the common enterprise.
"[fIn order to negate the finding of a security the offeree should have
known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or
interim certificate for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any
of the foregoing.
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 485-1(12) (1976) (emphasis added).
41. 52 Hawaii at 647, 485 P.2d at 108.
42. Id at 649, 485 P.2d at 109. The court acknowledged its debt to Professor Coffey as the
source of this definition. Id See Coffey, supra note 16.
Perhaps the earliest proponent of the "risk capital" theory was the court in Silver Hills Country
Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961), in which Justice Traynor
employed the phrase but did not define it. The court held that charter memberships in a country
club were within the regulatory purpose of the California Blue Sky Law. "[Ilts [the California
blue sky law's] objective is to afford those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing
their objectives in legitimate ventures whether or not they expect a return of their capital in one
form or another." Id at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89. See also 50 CAL. L. Rv.
156 (1962); 14 HASTNGs L.J. 181 (1962).
Number 4] 1239
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practical and actual control over the managerial decisions of the enter-
prise. For it is this control which gives the offeree the opportunity to
safeguard his own investment, thus obviating the need for state
intervention."'43
The Hawaii Market and Howey courts agree that the nature of the
investor's participation in the enterprise is critical in determining
whether a security exists. Under a literal application of Howey, even a
modicum of investor participation would remove the arrangement
from the definition of a security. Under the "risk capital" test, identify-
ing the investor participation is only a preliminary step in analyzing the
quality of the participation. Only actual and practical control of the
enterprise by each investor would remove the arrangement from the
definition of security. Although no federal courts appear formally to
have adopted the "risk capital" test, several, including the Williamson
court, analyze investor participation in terms similar to those that
would apply had they adopted the fourth element of the "risk capital"
test.
D. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman
In United Housing,' the first Supreme Court case involving invest-
ment contracts after Hawaii Market, the Court faced the converse of
the factual situation present in Joiner, Howey, and Hawaii Market.
The earlier cases involved financial arrangements not normally re-
garded as securities. In United Housing, the issue was whether stock in
a corporation, an interest that is almost invariably denominated a se-
curity, was outside the purview of the federal securities laws.45
Ownership of stock in a nonprofit housing cooperative entitled the
holders to lease an apartment in buildings owned by the cooperative.
The Court held that the stock was not a security because it had none of
the normal indicia of "stock." The stockholder had neither the right to
receive dividends46 nor the expectation of earning profits.47 As a conse-
43. 52 Hawaii at 652, 485 P.2d at 111 (citations omitted).
44. United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
45. The United Housing decision generated comment from the legal community. See, dg.,
Deacon & Prendergast, Defning a 'Security'After the Forman Decision, 11 P~c. L.J. 213 (1980); 9
Loy. L.A.L. REv. 206 (1975); 29 Sw. LJ. 987 (1976); 53 TEx. L. REv. 623 (1975).
46. 421 U.S. at 851.
47. Id
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quence, the stock did not satisfy the definition of an investment
contract.
In reaching its holding, the Court reaffirmed the Howey test as the
basis for distinguishing a securities transaction from other commercial
dealings and quoted the entire formula in full. 48 The Court introduced
a certain analytical ambiguity, however, by paraphrasing the original
Howey language in what may be referred to as the "touchstone" test.
The Court stated that "[t]he touchstone is [1] the presence of an invest-
ment [2] in a common venture [3] premised on a reasonable expectation
of profits [4] to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial ef-
forts of others."'49 The touchstone test omits the word "solely" from the
fourth element of the Howey test.
The Fifth Circuit in Williamson makes much of this omission and
suggests that it has great significance. 5' A careful reading of United
Housing, however, suggests that the omission of the word "solely" in
the touchstone test has minimal significance. First, the central issue in
United Housing was the meaning of the word "profits." The Court
found no profit inducement in purchasing the cooperative stock and, as
a consequence, no investment contract. It had no need, therefore, to
examine the fourth element of the Howey test. Second, the Court care-
fully noted that it was expressing no view whatsoever as to the correct
interpretation of the word "solely.15 1 When the Supreme Court next
considered the term "investment contract" in InternationalBrotherhood
48. Id at 852.
49. Id
50. In Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981), the
Fifth Circuit stated:
Moreover, the Supreme Court has altogether omitted the word "solely" in its most recent
formulation of the investment contract definition. In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman ... the Court quoted the investment contract definition from Howey and re-
stated it as 'an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of
profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.'
Id at 418-19.
51. The Court stated:
This test speaks in terms of "profits to come soley from the efforts of others." (Emphasis
supplied.) Although the issue is not presented in this case, we note that the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that "the word 'solely' should not be read as a
strict or literal limitation on the definition of an investment contract, but rather must be
construed realistically, so as to include within the definition those schemes which involve
in substance, if not form, securities." We express no view, however, as to the holding of
this case.
421 U.S. at 852 n.16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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of Teamsters v. Daniel,52 it again quoted with approval the original
Howey test53 and the touchstone test54 created in United Housing. This
would appear to rebut the Williamson court's suggestion that the word
"solely" has been deleted from the Howey test by the Supreme Court.
The United Housing Court also rejected a request that it adopt the
risk capital test,55 although it did not directly repudiate the doctrine.
The Court stated: "Even if we were inclined to adopt such a 'risk capi-
tal' approach we would not apply it in the present case. Purchasers of
apartments in Co-op City take no risk in any significant sense. If dis-
satisfied with their apartments, they may recover their initial invest-
ment in full."56
The holding in United Housing emphasized clearly that in determin-
ing the existence of an investment contract, the substance of the ar-
rangement, and not its form or name, governs. As a gloss on the
analysis of investment contracts, it added an explication of the term
"profits" and tacitly acknowledged the lower federal courts' growing
concern over the limitations of the word "solely" in the fourth element
of the Howey test. The preceding discussion depicts the state of the law
at the time the Fifth Circuit decided Williamson.
III. WILLIAMSON V. TUCKER
In Williamson, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals focused on joint
venture interests as securities. The court specifically considered
whether the retention of meaningful managerial powers by investor
joint venturers excluded the joint venture interest from the category of
investment contracts. The court held that absent certain "limited cir-
cumstances," the possession of those powers precludes a finding that
such interests are securities.57 The court's discussion of the genesis and
52. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
53. Id at 558.
54. Id at 561.
55. 421 U.S. at 857. The Court in United Housing attributed the risk capital test to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's opinion in Silver Hills Country Club rather than to Hawaii Market. See
note 42 supra and accompanying text.
56. Id at 857 n.24.
57. The procedural posture of Williamson is unusual but does not diminish the importance of
the court's holding and analysis. Appellants alleged violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, contending that the joint venture interests were securities
within the meaning of both. Appellees filed motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or, in the alternative, to dismiss for lack of subject matter juris-
diction under Rule 12(b)(1). The district court dismissed the suit without indicating upon which
[Vol. 59:1231
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/7
REAL ESTATE JOINT VENTURES
meaning of the phrase "investment contract" and its explicit formula-
tion of the appropriate investment contract test for a joint venture in-
terest have unusual importance because of the limited amount of
federal law in this area.58
Williamson concerned development of a 160 acre tract of land (the
"Venture Property") located between Dallas and Fort Worth, Texas,
near the then proposed Dallas-Fort Worth airport. Through a series of
four sales that occurred between 1969 and 1971, three separate joint
ventures (Reg Air I, Reg Air II, and Reg Air IV) each came to own an
undivided one-third interest in the Venture Property.
M.L. Godwin Investments, Inc., or its employees, executed contracts
to purchase an interest in the Venture Property, formed each joint ven-
ture, and then attracted potential investors to participate in the ven-
tures. The offering materials for each venture described, in similar
terms, the management expertise of Godwin and the investment poten-
tial of the Venture Property. Godwin managed the Venture Property
Rule it was relying. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court's dismissal was for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and was improper. After remand to the district court for substantive
determination, the Fifth Circuit had no reason to reach the merits of the case. In the interests of
judicial economy, however, the Fifth Circuit dealt with the substantive issues and formulated the
Williamson test. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981).
58. Federal case law on joint venture or general partnership interests as investment contracts
is relatively sparse. For some of the more important cases, see Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367, 371
(10th Cir. 1973) (when a joint owner of real property invested money and devoted substantial time
to the development of the property, but was "not given the right to share in the management or in
any decision to sell, mortgage, or dispose of the property," his interest was a security); Nor-Tex
Agencies, Inc. v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093, 1099 (5th Cir. 1973) (when the promoter was to take the
initiative and the joint venture investor in an oil and gas transaction was to remain "compara-
tively passive," the joint venture interest was a security), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); San-
dusky Land, Ltd. v. Uniplan Groups, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (no security
when a general partner was "actively... involved in the decision-making process"); Hirsch v. du
Pont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (when general partners had a degree of managerial
control that afforded them access to information about the issuer, the partnership interests were
not securities), qfl'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977); New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Sloan, 394 F.
Supp. 1303, 1314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (when a general partner chooses to delegate his day-to-day
managerial responsibilities to a committee, his retained ability to vote and responsibility for part-
nership acts compel a conclusion that his interest was not a security); Oxford Finance Cos. v.
Harvey, 385 F. Supp. 431, 433-34 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (when a joint venturer had authority over many
decisions, including approval of all plans and specifications and all expenditures in excess of
$10,000, there was no security); Bryant v. Uland, 327 F. Supp. 439, 442 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (a joint
venture interest in undivided, working interests was conceded to be a security by the defendant-
promoter); Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (when a general partner-
ship agreement gave controlling power to three managing partners, the partnership interests of
other general partners were securities).
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on behalf of each of the joint ventures. Each joint venture acquired its
one-third undivided interest at a different time and paid a different
purchase price. Each joint venture financed its purchase with a promis-
sory note to the seller with several, but not joint, liability among the
joint venturers. Despite numerous other similarities in the transaction,
the actual ownership of each joint venture was not identical. Although
there were differences in the specific provisions of the various joint ven-
ture agreements, the court concluded that "[n]evertheless, the transac-
tions were all arranged by Godwin Investments and are identical in all
other relevant respects."59
Because of the factual setting, the Williamson court had no reason to
comment extensively about the first three elements of the Howey test.
The first element was satisfied because of the joint venturer's liability
under the promissory notes. There was no dispute about the existence
of a common enterprise, so satisfaction of the second element was not
raised. As to the third element, the investors reasonably anticipated
making profits, and the promotional literature emphasized that such
profits would occur.
Only the fourth element of the Howey test, the managerial efforts
from which the investor expected to receive profits, was an open issue.
In the Fifth Circuit, however, this element has been modified from the
original Howey test. In SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. ,60 the Fifth
Circuit expressly adopted the standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit
in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. ,61 in which the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the salient factor to be considered was whether the efforts
that most critically determined the success or failure of the enterprise
were those made by persons other than the investor.62 This modifica-
59. 645 F.2d at 408.
60. 497 F.2d 473, 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
61. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). See 52 N.C.L. Rav. 476 (1973);
51 TEx. L. REv. 788 (1973); 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 487 (1973).
62. 474 F.2d at 482. The court stated:
[I]n light of the remedial nature of the legislation, the statutory policy of affording broad
protection to the public, and the Supreme Court's admonitions that the definition of
securities should be a flexible one, the word "solely" should not be read as a strict or
literal limitation on the definition of an investment contract, but rather must be con-
strued realistically, so as to include within the definition those schemes which involve in
substance, if not form, securities.
... 107e adopt a more realistic test, whether the eforts made by those other than the
investor are the undeniably signficant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect
thefailure or success ofthe enterprise.
Id (emphasis added).
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tion permits finding an investment contract when none may have ex-
isted under the original test. Under a literal application of Howey,
even a scintilla of managerial involvement by the investor arguably
would be sufficient to preclude a finding of an investment contract.
The Fifth Circuit's modification provides that even a finding of a scin-
tilla of investor involvement would still require further analysis as to
who provided the essential managerial services, the promoter or the
investor.
The Williamson court articulated a three-part factual test to deter-
mine whether the fourth element of the Howey test was satisfied for a
joint venture interest. The court stated that such a characterization
required
that (1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the
hands of the partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes
power as would a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is so
inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapa-
ble of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture powers; or (3) the
partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique enterpreneurial or
managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot replace the
manager of the enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or
venture powers.63
One troublesome aspect of the Williamson test is the premise that
joint venture or general partnership interests are properly subject to a
specific investment contract analysis different from any other invest-
ment. A joint venture agreement results from negotiation, and the par-
ties to the agreement establish their own rules for governing their
relationship. There is no standard or statutory distribution of power.
The consistent teaching of the Supreme Court from Joiner through
Daniel is that the name of an interest does not alone establish whether
it is a security. The Williamson test offers an alluring formula that pur-
ports to delineate the investment contract inquiry for a joint venture
interest. The test, however, should not be taken as an independent for-
mulation removed from conventional investment contract analysis. It
is properly only a specific application of, and not a replacement for, the
broader principles of Howey.
The Williamson test directs judicial inquiry, in turn, to (1) the enter-
prise's document, (2) the investor, and (3) the promoter.' An analysis
63. 645 F.2d at 424.
64. The Williamson court specifically noted that these factors should not be considered cx-
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of each variable reveals the existence and reasonableness of the inves-
tors' managerial expectations. The conclusion that the investor reason-
ably expected to receive profits derived from essential managerial
services of another can be based upon (1) the formal, documentary,
distribution of power; (2) the fact that the investors' efforts could not
conceivably give rise to any profits; or (3) the fact that the promoter's
talents are so remarkable or unique that the investors' efforts could not
have any significant effect on making profits.
.The test must be applied to each investor. One possible analytical
anomaly is that a joint venture interest could be a security as to some
investors and not to others. Investors' abilities to participate in the en-
terprise vary. A real estate developer who invests in another devel-
oper's enterprise may have the reasonable expectation that he will
participate in management and help make profits. His joint venture
interest might not constitute an investment contract. Conversely, the
same ownership interest and the same right to vote owned by a doctor
with little or no management expertise might constitute an investment
contract under the Williamson test, because no reasonable expectation
of managerial involvement may exist.
The Fifth Circuit's statement that a joint venture interest can be a
security "only" if it satisfies one of the three elements of the Wiiamson
test suggests a judicial presumption that ordinarily such interests are
not securities. This implicit presumption has support from commenta-
tors.65 Even while articulating the formidable barriers to finding that a
joint venture interest is a security, the Williamson court acknowledged
the possibility that the test might be satisfied.6 6
haustive: "mhis is not to say that other factors could not also give rise to such a dependence on
the promoter or manager that the exercise of partnership powers would be effectively precluded."
Id at 424 n.15.
65. JENNINGS & MARSH, SEcURrrms REGULATION 252 (4th ed. 1977). The authors state:
An interest in a joint venture or general partnership normally is the antithesis of an
"investment contract" or "profit-sharing agreement." The Uniform Partnership Act de-
fines a partnership to be "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners
a business for profit." Thus the right to participate in the management and control of the
business is a fundamental characteristic of the partnership. The general partners of a
partnership are not passive investors who place money in an enterprise with the expecta-
tion of deriving profits solely from the efforts of others. Rather, they expect to reap
profits through their own active participation in the control and management of the
business.
id
66. 645 F.2d at 424.
The court had stated earlier
It should be clear from the context of the cases discussed above, however, that the mere
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The court's premise that the distribution of power of the enterprise
"as in a limited partnership" necessarily leads to a conclusion that the
agreement is an investment contract warrants some discussion. Certain
courts have held that interests in limited partnerships are investment
contracts67 as a matter of law. The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion routinely treats limited partnership interests as securities. 68 The
better view, however, was expressed in Stowell v. Ted S. Finkel Invest-
ment Services, Inc. ,69 in which the Florida District Court referred to the
economic reality tests enunciated by the Supreme Court in Tcherepnin
v. Knight,7° United Housing, and Daniel and held that the crucial issue
fact that an investment takes the form of a general partnership or joint venture does not
inevitably insulate it from the reach of the federal securities laws.
A scheme which sells investments to inexperienced and unknowledgeable members of
the general public cannot escape the reach of the securities laws merely by labeling itself
a general partnership or joint venture. Such investors may be led to expect profits to be
derived from the efforts of others in spite of partnership powers nominally retained by
them.
Id at 422-23.
67. See, e.g., Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939
(1979); Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977); Nor-Tex Agencies,
Inc. v. Jones, 482 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
68. In 17 C.F.R. § 240.3(a)1 1-1 (1981), for example, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion expressly includes interests in limited partnerships and joint ventures in the definition of
"equity security" for purposes of §§ 12(g) and 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
Commission states:
The term "equity security" is hereby defined to include any stock or similar security,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing agreement, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, voting trust certificate or certificate of de-
posit for an equity security, limiledpartnershop interest, interest in ajoint venture, or certif-
icate of interest in a business trust; or any security convertible, with or without
consideration into such security, or carrying any warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase such a security; or any such warrant or right; or any put, call, straddle, or other
option or privilege of buying such a security from or selling such a security to another
without being bound to do so.
Id (emphasis added). See SEC Rel. No. 33-4877 (Aug. 8, 1967), 32 Fed. Reg. 11,705 (1967),
which states in pertinent part:
Under the federal securities laws, an offering of limited partnership interests and inter-
ests in joint or profit sharing real estate ventures generally constitutes an offering of a
"profit sharing agreement" or an "investment contract" which is a "security" within the
meaning of Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933.
* * ' [I]f the promoters of a real estate syndication offer investors the opportunity to
share in the profits of real estate syndications or similar ventures, particularly when there
is no active participation in the management and operation of the scheme on the part of
the investors, the promoters are, in effect, offering a "security."
[1973] 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1046, at 2062. See also SEC Rel. No. 34-14273 (Dec. 15,
1977), [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,387.
69. 489 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
70. 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
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in each case was whether the partnership agreement entered into by the
parties met established investment contract criteria. Resolution of the
issue is only possible on a case-by-case inquiry." It cannot be overem-
phasized that the name of an interest, including any implications aris-
ing from the standard distribution of power for such an interest, does
not establish whether the interest is an investment contract. Interests in
limited partnerships, general partnerships, or joint ventures may or
may not constitute investment contracts. The decision can be made
only by reviewing the precise facts of each transaction.
The Fifth Circuit's initial inquiry under the Williamson test required
an examination of how the joint venture agreement distributed power
among the joint venturers. The promoter and manager, Godwin, was a
party to the joint venture agreements.72 In the offering materials, God-
win represented that it would ultimately pursue the sale or develop-
ment of the Venture Property, and "would perform all management
duties, including efforts to have the land rezoned from single-family
residential to its best uses."17 3  The materials emphasized: "OUR
FIRM AGGRESSIVELY PURSUES ALL ZONING AND PROPER
LAND PLANNING EFFORTS TO ASSURE THE MAXIMUM
PROFIT POTENTIAL OF EACH INVESTMENT. '74 Based solely
on these facts, which indicated that Godwin would play an active man-
agement role, an investor joint venturer might reasonably have be-
lieved that Godwin would supply the essential managerial efforts from
which the enterprise would realize its profits.
71. 489 F. Supp. at 1220.
72. Although the Williamson court does not refer to Godwin as a joint venturer, an examina-
tion of the Reg Air I joint venture agreement shows that Godwin was a signatory. The agreement
is attached as Appendix Number 1, Brief for Appellees James F. Mason, L.R. Polan, Jr., and M.L.
Godwin Investments, Inc. The agreement for Reg Air I provided that:
Subject to the reservation of control in the Joint Venturers as specified in this Article
VIII and until further action by the Joint Venturers, the Joint Venturers hereby desig-
nate M.L. Godwin Investments, Inc. as manager of the Venture Property to do all things
necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of this Joint Venture. So long as the
Venture Property remains undeveloped, M.L. Godwin Investments, Inc. shall not be en-
titled to receive any compensation for its services as manager of the Venture Property
other than the compensation to be received at the closing of the purchase of the Venture
Property. As space becomes available for rent, M.L. Godwin Investments, Inc. shall be
entitled to compensation as manager and the Joint Venture shall enter into a manage-
ment contract with M.L. Godwin Investments, Inc.
Reg Air I Joint Venture Agreement § 8.03, at 6, Brief for Appellees, app. 1, Williamson v. Tuck-
er, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981).
73. 645 F.2d at 408.
74. Id
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The Williamson court, however, did not stop its inquiry after discov-
ering those facts. Even if Godwin were to provide those managerial
services, the court made further examination of whether the investor
retained control over the manager. The difficulty of answering this
critical question was magnified because each joint venture had approxi-
mately fifteen venturers.75 As the court stated, "[A] complication is ad-
ded where the investment asset is not owned directly, but is held
instead through a joint venture or general partnership. While the part-
nership per se may have full ownership powers over the asset, each
individual partner has only his proportionate vote in the
partnership."76
Each joint venture agreement gave the venturers the right to control
certain areas of management. Decisions to borrow money or to deliver
any bonds, mortgages, or deeds required the affirmative vote of all joint
venturers.77 Any development proposal for the Venture Property like-
wise required the approval of a significant number of venturers. 78 Re-
gardless of whether the Venture Property was developed, a significant
number of the venturers could remove Godwin as manager and "make
any other decision regarding the Property."79 The joint venturers, in
the aggregate, thus had significant opportunity to control the manage-
ment of the joint venture and the development of the Venture Property.
Although the venturers, in the aggregate, had significant manage-
ment control, there remained the further question of whether each in-
vestor also had significant control. Each joint venture consisted of
approximately fifteen venturers. The four plaintiffs, Blake, Lilley, Wil-
liamson, and Wilson, each held minority interests in the ventures. Wil-
liamson had the largest individual interest, with a twenty percent
interest in Reg Air I, II and IV, while Wilson and Blake each held only
75. Id Reg. Air I had 13 venturers, Reg Air II had 17 venturers, and Reg Air IV had 10
venturers. Brief for Appellees Trustees of the Home Interiors and Gifts Employees Profit Sharing
Trust at 4, Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981).
76. 645 F.2d at 421.
77. Each joint venture agreement requires unanimous consent of the venturers to confess
a judgment; to make, execute or deliver any bond, mortgage, deed of trust, guarantee,
indemnity bond, surety bond or accommodation paper or accommodation endorsement;
to borrow money in the name of the joint venture or use joint venture property as colat-
eral; and to amend the agreement to modify the rights of the venturers.
Id at 408-09.
78. Id at 409.
79. Id Depending upon the joint venture, the vote of 60% or 70%, in interest, of the ventur-
ers was required.
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five percent interests in Reg Air II.8° Although the court noted the
dilutive effect on management control created by selling interests to
numerous investors, it drew no adverse conclusions on the basis of the
sale of venture interests by Godwin to an average of fifteen investors.8'
Having fifteen investors actively participate in or simply control
management presents significant practical problems. Conflicts arise in
scheduling and attending meetings. Even when the investors in the
aggregate retain latent management control, the logistical inertia cre-
ated by a group of otherwise unconnected investors may prevent their
actual exercise of those powers.
The facts in Williamson support this conclusion. From the time the
joint ventures were formed, between 1969 and 1971, until at least late
1975, the plaintiffs relied entirely on Godwin "and made no attempt to
oversee or participate in the management of the Property." 2 It was not
until late 1975, when the plaintiffs claimed they first became aware of
alleged securities laws violations, that any of the plaintiffs participated
in joint venture meetings.8 3 There is no bright-line test for determining
when an enterprise has so many investors that their individual vote is
meaningless to safeguard their investment or to control either the enter-
prise or the manager. The results in Williamson, however, support a
conclusion that when an enterprise has fifteen otherwise unrelated in-
vestors, none of them may possess meaningful rights to control the
enterprise.
An issue not raised by the litigants or addressed by the Williamson
court is whether the offerings in the three joint ventures should have
been integrated and considered as a single offering of interests. The
ventues may have involved a single plan of financing, class of securi-
ties, and type of consideration. Within broad parameters, the agree-
ments were executed at approximately the same time for the general
purpose of developing the Venture Property. 4 Although not free from
80. Id at 407. See note 92 infra.
81. Id at 423. The court stated:
[O]ne would not expect partnership interests sold to large numbers of the general public
to provide any real partnership control; at some point there would be so many partners
that a partnership vote would be more like a corporate vote, each partner's role having
been diluted to the level of a single shareholder in a corporation. Such an arrangement
might well constitute an investment contract.
Id
82. Id at 409.
83. Id at 424.
84. In SEC Rel. No. 33-4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (1962), the SEC enunciated
[Vol. 59:1231
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss4/7
REAL ESTATE JOINT VENTURES
doubt, the offerings could have been integrated, thereby increasing con-
siderably the total number of investors even after allowing for some
duplication of investors. Whether the presence of twenty or thirty in-
vestors would have prompted the Williamson court to address directly
the issue of the meaningfulness of the powers retained by an individual
investor under those circumstances is conjectural.
Whether the offerings are considered as separate or integrated, the
sheer number of investors in Williamson significantly diluted voting
power and created logistical complications. The presence of many in-
vestors would appear directly and negatively to affect an individual in-
vestor's ability to exercise meaningful management control. Given the
court's emphasis on the significance of the distribution of power and
the investor's actual ability to exercise power, the court's failure to pro-
vide guidance by stating what importance, if any, should be attached to
the actual number of joint venturers is unfortunate and disappointing.
The first element of the Williamson test calls for a probe of the power
retained by the investor. The thrust of the inquiry is whether the inves-
tor has power to manage the enterprise, or, at a minimum, to control
the manager of the enterprise. This latter aspect of the Williamson test
is consistent with a series of cases decided by the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits 5 and relied on by the Fifth Circuit, which held that investors
the principles to be considered in determining whether purportedly separate offerings should be
integrated and treated as a single offering:
A determination whether an offering is public or private would also include a consid-
eration of the question whether it should be regarded as a part of a larger offering made
or to be made. The following factors are relevant to such question of integration:
whether (1) the different offerings are part of a single plan of financing, (2) the offerings
involve issuance of the same class of security, (3) the offerings are made at or about the
same time, (4) the same type of consideration is to be received, (5) the offerings are
made for the same general purpose.
What may appear to be a separate offering to a properly limited group will not be so
considered if it is one of a related series of offerings. A person may not separate parts of
a series of related transactions, the sum total of which is really one offering, and claim
that a particular part is a non-public transaction. Thus, in the case of offerings of frac-
tional undivided interests in separate oil or gas properties where the promoters must
constantly find new participants for each new venture, it would appear to be appropriate
to consider the entire series of offerings to determine the scope of this solicitation.
Id
85. See, e.g., Schultz v. Dain Corp., 568 F.2d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1978) (when the purchasers of
an apartment complex executed a non-revocable three year management agreement with the
seller, the purchaser retained "ultimate control" over the apartment complex, and there was no
security); Ballard & Cordell Corp. v. Zoller & Dannenberg Exploration, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1059,
1065-66 (10th Cir. 1976) (when an oil drilling operating agreement permitted the investor to ap-
prove certain expenses and to leave the enterprise under certain circumstances, there was no secur-
ity), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 915 (8th Cir.
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possessing potential control over management did not purchase
securities.86
Based on Williamson, possession, rather than exercise, of power de-
termines whether an interest is an investment contract. This concept is
consistent with the consequences of holding that an interest is an in-
vestment contract. If a joint venture interest is a security, then the pro-
moter, as issuer, is subject to the full panoply of registration and
disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws. Either the joint
venture interest must be registered pursuant to the provisions of section
587 of the Securities Act of 1933 or it must be exempt. The issuer must
fully and fairly disclose all material facts and is accountable under sec-
tions 1288 and 1789 of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 10(b) 90 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for failure to comply.
Compliance with the registration and disclosure provisions can occur
only if the offeror can determine that the joint venture interest is a se-
curity prior to the offer and sale. As a consequence, when determining
the existence or nonexistence of a security, only those facts determina-
ble when the offer and sale occurred should be considered. Otherwise,
an interest that appeared to be a nonsecurity on the basis of facts that
existed at the time of sale could become a security on the basis of
events that transpired subsequent to sale. Promoters can comply with
the federal securities laws only if the determinative control is the con-
trol apparently exercisable by the investor when he purchases the
interest.
Although the Williamson test is based on the potential control avail-
1976) (when the purchasers of an apartment complex executed a management agreement with the
seller that permitted the purchaser to terminate the management agreement upon 30 days notice,
there was no security); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 460 F.2d 666, 669-70 (10th Cir.
1972) (when a franchise agreement envisioned substantial operation by the franchisor but left
some meaningful control in the hands of the franchisee, there was no security).
86. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 421.
These cases from the Tenth and Eighth Circuits-dealing in turn with the purchase of
franchise, oil and gas, and real estate interests--are consistent in their treatment of latent
investor control. In each case the actual control exercised by the purchaser is irrelevant.
So long as the investor has the right to control the asset he has purchased, he is not
dependent on the promoter or on a third party for "those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise."
Id (emphasis added).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
88. 1d. § 771 (1976).
89. Id. § 77q (1976).
90. Id. § 78j (1976).
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able to the investor, the opinion does not preclude judicial examination
of the powers actually exercised by the investors. Examination of this
power may assist the trier of fact in determining whether the control
expectations of the parties were realistic when the interest was
purchased.
An examination of the joint venture agreements in Williamson
reveals that the investors were not precluded from participating in
management. They retained numerous controls, including the right to
replace the manager. Therefore, under the first element of the William-
son test, the joint venture agreements were not investment contracts.
The joint venture document provided investors theoretical rights to
control. The second and third elements of the Williamson test mandate
a critical examination of the investor, the promoter, and the relation-
ship of the investor to the promoter to confirm whether the investor
could have had the reasonable expectation or capacity to exercise those
rights. This feasibility inquiry was crucial, in the Williamson court's
view, because "[ilnsofar as the power retained by the investors is a real
one which they are in fact capable of exercising, courts have uniformly
refused to find securities in such cases." 91
If the joint venture document provides the investors with certain la-
tent management powers, investment contract analysis compels two ad-
ditional investigations respecting those powers. The first line of inquiry
is whether the power is real. The second is whether the investors are
capable of exercising that power.
The Williamson court made no independent statement concerning
the reality of the plaintiffs' retained powers. The court did, however,
analyze the background and abilities of the investors to determine
whether the investors could exercise their latent management power.
The four plaintiffs were executives with Frito-Lay, Inc., a subsidiary
of Pepsico, Inc. Williamson was Chairman of the Board during Lilley's
tenure as President. The plaintiffs owned differing percentages of the
joint ventures.92 Williamson and Lilley had participated in other joint
91. 645 F.2d at 419.
92. The holdings of the plaintiffs in the Joint Ventures were as follows:
Reg Air I Reg Air I1 Reg Air IV
Williamson 20% Williamson 20% Williamson 20%
Lilley 10% Lilley 10%
Wilson 5%
Blake 5%
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ventures organized by Godwin.93 The court concluded without further
inquiry that "it is clear that plaintiffs had the business experience and
knowledge adequate to the exercise of partnership powers in a real es-
tate joint venture. '94 This conclusion, however, is not as "clear" as the
court assumed.
The issue of the standard for investor sophistication, knowledge, and
competence is a recurring one in securities analysis. Broker/dealers
must evaluate investor sophistication to sell securities that are "suita-
ble" to an investor's individual circumstances." Investor sophistication
is also raised specifically when evaluating an investor as an offeree for a
private placement conducted under the Rule 146 exemption.96
Id at 407.
93. Id at 425.
94. Id
95. New York Stock Exchange Rule 405 provides:
Every member organization is required through a general partner, a principal execu-
tive officer or a person or persons designated under the provisions of Rule 342(b)(1) to
(1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer, every or-
der, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by such organization and every
person holding power of attorney over any account accepted or carried by such
organization.
[1978] 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 3697.
Article III, § 2 of the Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of Securities Dealers
provides:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a mem-
ber shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for
such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his
other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.
NASD MAN. (CCH) 2152 (1976).
17 C.F.R. § 240.15(b)10-3 (1981) provides:
Every non-member broker or dealer and every associated person who recommends to a
customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security shall have reasonable grounds to
believe that the recommendation is not unsuitable for such customer on the basis of
information furnished by such customer after reasonable inquiry concerning the cus-
tomer's investment objectives, financial situation and needs, and any other information
known by such broker or dealer or associated person.
Id
96. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d) (1981) provides:
(d) Nature of offerees. The issuer and any person acting on its behalf who offer, offer
to sell, offer for sale or sell the securities shall have reasonable grounds to believe and
shall believe:
(1) Immediately prior to making any offer, either.
(i) That the offeree has such knowledge and experience in financial and busi-
ness matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospec-
tive investment, or
(ii) That the offeree is a person who is able to bear the economic risk of the
investment, and
(2) Immediately prior to making any sale, after making reasonable inquiry, either.
(i) That the offeree has such knowledge and experience in financial and busi-
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REAL ESTATE JOINT VENTURES
An investor has the requisite sophistication only when he has "suffi-
cient investment, business, and other experience, education, and actual
knowledge to understand the mechanics and risks of the invest-
ments."97 General business sophistication is not sufficient.98 Rather,
investor sophistication is a product of the investor's experience and
knowledge. Williamson, Lilley, Blake, and Wilson were executives of a
national snack food corporation. Despite that status, however, they
may have lacked any knowledge relevant to the development of the
Venture Property. Mastery of zoning, building codes, and construction
costs and methods is not a prerequisite to success as a purveyor of food.
Sophistication and expertise in one business arena, without more, does
not imply sophistication or knowledge in another.
The Williamson court may have been correct in concluding that the
plaintiffs were capable of exercising their latent control. Reaching that
conclusion, however, solely by reason of the plaintiffs' executive status
with Frito-Lay and the investment by two of the plaintiffs in other real
estate joint ventures requires an awe-inspiring leap of faith. Meaning-
ful exercise of control requires both the substantive knowledge to eval-
uate problems and sufficient leverage to effect the decision making
process. The Court apparently accepted a substitution of sophistication
standard. This concept should be rejected, because an apparently so-
phisticated investor who lacks the relevant experience may in fact be so
dependent on the promoter or manager that he satisfies the fourth ele-
ment of the Howey test.
ness matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospec-
tive investment, or
(ii) That the offeree and his offeree representative(s) together have such knowl-
edge and experience in financial and business matters that they are capable of
evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment and that the offesee
is able to bear the economic risk of the investment.
Id
97. For an excellent article discussing these factors, see Soraghan, Private Offerings.: Deter-
mining ' 4ccess," "In 'estment Sophistication," and "Ability to Bear Economic Risk," 8 SEc. REG.
L.J. 3, 24 (1980).
98. As Soraghan explains the problem:
Business experience, or success in a business occupation, will suffice in place of actual
investment experience only when such business or occupational experience establishes
general knowledge of financial and other risk concepts applicable to businesses gener-
ally, not only the risks of the business of the investor. General business sophistication
will not suffice; the occupation should be one in which the investor deals regularly with
financial matters, such as that of an accountant or a corporate attorney actually dealing
with such affairs.
Id at 25.
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After the court concluded that the joint venture interests were not
investment contracts under either of the first two elements of the Wil-
liamson test, it examined the third element of the test: whether the
promoter has talents.so unique that either (1) he cannot be replaced, or
(2) as a consequence of the importance of his talents to the venture, the
investor, as a practical matter, cannot exercise the latent or nominal
powers that he possesses.9 9 To the extent that the standards under the
third test are absolute, this portion of the Williamson test goes beyond
the boundaries of Howey. Nothing suggested that the talents of the
service company in Howey were unique or irreplaceable, only that
those talents were the ones that would produce profits for the investors.
As an example of a theoretical application of this statement, the
court noted that investors may enter a venture on the promise that the
manager has a unique understanding of the local market.' °° The
agreement may provide the investors with the legal right to fire the
manager. Exercise of that right would, however, forfeit the manage-
ment ability upon which the success of the venture depends. When the
putative right is effectively nonexercisable, the illusion of power to re-
move will not preclude a finding that an investment contract exists.
The court concluded that this theoretical statement did not apply to the
facts in Williamson. Plaintiffs alleged a generalized argument that they
were dependent on Godwin. They did not, however, raise "the possi-
bility of a dependence on the unique or irreplaceable expertise of God-
win Investments as an issue in this case."''1
Judicial determination as to the satisfaction of the second element of
the Williamson test does not necessarily mean that a similar conclusion
will be reached with respect to the third element. Inquiry under the
second element focuses on what may be characterized as "investor de-
pendence," while inquiry under the third element seeks "promoter in-
dependence." Although the concepts are similar, they are not
necessarily corollary. An otherwise qualified investor under the second
element may still hold an investment contract if, under the third ele-
99. The court stated:
The plaintiffs must allege that Godwin Investments was uniquely capable of such tasks
or that the partners were incapable, within reasonable limits, of finding a replacement
manager. Godwin Investments'promise must be more than a binding contract enforceable
under state law; it must create the sort of dependence implicit in an investment contract.
Williamson, 645 F.2d at 425 (emphasis added).
100. Id at 423.
101. Id at 425.
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ment, the manager is deemed to have unique talents. The Williamson
court, however, failed to find either "investor dependence" or "pro-
moter independence" in the facts before it, so it did not explore the
subtle distinctions between the second and third elements of the test.
The Fifth Circuit's articulation of investment contract theory as ap-
plied to a joint venture is comprehensive. Owing to the relative dearth
of federal appellate statements on this issue, Williamson apparently
now stands as the standard for future analysis. The remainder of this
Article accordingly examines the analytical problems faced by joint
venture promoters and their counsel in light of the newly announced
joint venture test.
IV. AFTER WILLIAMSON V TUCKER
The consistent theme of Howey and its progeny, including William-
son, is that although investors have a difficult burden to sustain, joint
venture interests can be securities. When organizing a joint venture,
therefore, the real estate promoter and his counsel must make three
initial determinations: (1) whether an interest in the joint venture is a
security; (2) what compliance with state and federal securities law is
required if the interest is a security; and (3) what compliance with state
and federal securities law is possible without conceding that the interest
is a security. The factual analysis that determines the existence of an
investment contract is sensitive and subject to error. Even a good faith
determination that under the Williamson and Howey tests an interest is
not a security should not prevent consideration of the consequences of
the alternative conclusion that the interest is a security.
Section 5 of the Securities Act102 makes unlawful the selling of any
security unless a registration statement is in effect as to the security.
Sale of the interest either must be registered under the Securities Act
and the relevant state "blue sky" laws, or an exemption from registra-
tion under such laws must be obtained. Similarly, the seller of the se-
curity either must be registered as a broker/dealer under the Exchange
Act and the applicable "blue sky" laws, or an exemption from registra-
tion under such laws must be available. Under all circumstances, full,
fair, and complete disclosure of material information so as to permit
the investor to make an informed decision must be provided to each
investor.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
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If the joint venture promoter and his counsel conclude that the inter-
est is a security, their course of action is clear. A disclosure document
will be prepared and the security will be registered with the appropriate
state and federal regulatory agencies, or the available registration ex-
emptions will be secured. Similar precautions will be effected with re-
spect to the seller of the interests.
If counsel concludes, however, that the interest is not a security, there
is no reason to register either the joint venture interest or the seller of
the interests with the state or federal regulatory agencies. The joint
venture promoter, however, may not be certain that an interest is not a
security. Because of the possibility of a subsequent adverse judicial de-
termination that the interest is a security, the conservative promoter
and his counsel may explore the circumstances, if any, under which an
interest can be sold in compliance with state and federal securities law
without taking affirmative action with the regulatory agencies. The fol-
lowing discussion will explore both the laws to be complied with and
the degree of compliance that is possible without concluding or declar-
ing that the joint venture interest is a security.
A. Federal Exemption from Registration
The preliminary inquiry is whether an exemption from the registra-
tion provisions of the Securities Act exists. The primary exemptions
are the intrastate exemption and the private placement exemption.
These exemptions, however, exempt the interest only from the registra-
tion provisions of the Securities Act. They do not exempt an issuer
from compliance with the antifraud and antimisstatement
requirements. 10 3
If the joint venture, its partners, and its property are all located
within one state, then the "intrastate" exemption may be available as
per section 3(a)(ll) °4 of the Securities Act and Rule 147105 promul-
gated thereunder. Section 3(a)(l 1) provides that the registration provi-
sions of the Securities Act do not apply to a class of securities when the
security "is a part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident
within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a
person resident, and doing business within, or if a corporation, incorpo-
103. See text accompanying notes 88-90 supra.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1976).
105. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1981).
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rated by and doing business within, such State or Territory."' 6 Rule
147 delineates the "safe harbor" provisions of section 3(a)(l I). l °7
If the intrastate exemption is available, the joint venture agreement
should detail the facts supporting that conclusion. The same represen-
tations that would be obtained from the investor in an acknowledged
intrastate offering should be procured. The investor should represent
that (1) he is a bona fide resident of the state; (2) he will remain such
for at least nine months following his purchase of the joint venture in-
terest; and (3) he is purchasing his interest with an investment intent
and without a view to the resale or redistribution of his interest. Trans-
fers by the investor of his interest to nonresidents of the state should be
subject to an opinion of counsel that the transfer is lawful.
The second major exemption from the registration provisions of the
Securities Act is the so-called "private placement" exemption provided
by section 4(2)108 and Rule 146109 promulgated thereunder. If the joint
venture partners are limited to a small number of investors who possess
the requisite investment sophistication to qualify as "private place-
ment" offerees, the section 4(2) exemption may be available.
Exemption under Rule 146, which requires absolute compliance with
each of its terms, will not be available to joint venture partners. The
rule requires filing Form 146 with the appropriate SEC regional of-
fice,'" 0 and failure to file destroys the availability of the exemption. Be-
106. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(ll) (1976).
107. A discussion of the intricacies of the "intrastate exemption" is beyond the scope of this
Article. Numerous commentators, however, have explored the problems in detail. See Carney,
Exemptionsfrom Securities Registration for Small Issuers: Shitingfrom Full Disclosure-Part II.
The Intrastate Offering Exemption and Rule 147, I1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 161 (1976); Cum-
mings, The Intrastate Exemption and the Shallow Harbor of Rule 147, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 167
(1974); Gardiner, Intrastate Offering Exemption: Rule 147-Progress or Stalemate?, 35 OHIO ST.
LJ. 340 (1974); Hicks, Intrastate Offerings Under Rule 147, 72 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1974).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1976). "The provisions of section 77e of this title [registration provi-
sions] shall not apply to ... transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering." Id
Secondary sources have extensively considered the problems of compliance with the private
placement exemption at the federal level. See Erwin, Private Placements and Limited Partnership
Offerings: Changes in the Rules, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 280 (1977); Green & Wittner, Private
Placements of Securities Under Rule 146, 21 PRAc. LAW. 9 (1975); Kinderman, The Private Offer-
ing Exemption: An Examination ofits Availability Under and Outside Rule 146, 30 Bus. LAW. 921
(1975); Schwartz, Rule 146: The Private Offering Exemption-Historical Perspective andAnayvsis,
35 OHIO ST. L.J. 738 (1974); Schwartz, The Private Offering Exemption-Recent Developments, 37
OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1976); Soraghan, supra note 97; Wolfson, Rule 146: Filing Requirements and
Proposed Restrictions on Offeree Representatives, I CORP. L. REV. 364 (1978).
109. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1981).
110. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(i) (1981).
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cause the joint venture promoter and its counsel have concluded that
the interest is not a security, consistency of interpretation requires them
not to file Form 146. It is important to note, however, that failure to
perfect a Rule 146 exemption is not fatal to a claim that the issuer has a
valid exemption under section 4(2) because the rule is a "safe harbor"
and is not the exclusive method of complying with section 4(2). Even
in the absence of a Rule 146 exemption, the joint venture could still
have a valid private placement exemption.
A joint venture promoter seeking to preserve a private placement ex-
emption should obtain representations that the investor (1) can bear
the economic risk of the investment; (2) is aware of the risks of real
estate investment and its illiquid character; (3) is purchasing the inter-
est for his own account and not with a view toward resale or redistribu-
tion; and (4) is aware that the interest cannot be assigned, transferred,
or sold without an opinion of counsel that the transfer is lawful. The
promoter should verify these representations with the investor and his
advisors.
The presence of sophisticated investors with the capacity to fend for
themselves is a predicate for both the private placement exemption and
a finding under the second element of the Williamson test that a joint
venture interest is not a security. Whether the promoter is seeking to
preserve the private placement exemption or avoid a determination
that the joint venture interest is a security, it is imperative that he offer
the interests only to appropriate investors. If the investor is unsophisti-
cated, his presence may render a private placement exemption unavail-
able. An unsophisticated investor may likewise be incapable of
exercising managerial control and thereby cause his joint venture inter-
est to be deemed a security. The outcome of involving inappropriate
investors may be catastrophic, and, accordingly, the promoter should
restrict all offers to investors who, either by themselves or in conjunc-
tion with their advisers, are sophisticated.
B. Disclosure
If either the intrastate or private placement exemption is available
the interest will be exempt from the federal registration provisions.
Neither exemption, however, exempts the issuer from the disclosure re-
quirements, including the antifraud provisions, that can be satisfied
only by providing full disclosure. The promoter and his counsel should
prepare and distribute to each offeree written information containing
[Vol. 59:1231
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all available information regarding the venture and the promoter. The
investor should represent that he has received all the information re-
garding the joint venture, the promoter, and the venture's operations
that he has requested. Verification of investor representations should
be as comprehensive as if the offer were, in fact, an offering of securi-
ties. Prophylactic securities procedure and prudent business practice
mandate that the promoter determine that his partners have the
financial and educational sophistication required to participate mean-
ingfully in management. The same logic compels providing investors
with all material information.
If the joint venture promoter follows these procedures, he will pre-
pare an effective substitute for a due diligence file. He will possess
written evidence that he has investigated both the investment and the
investors, just as he would for an acknowledged securities offering.
The file should contain all correspondence with investors, including all
written materials and projections furnished. Although the fie will not
contain a document directly corresponding to a prospectus, the aggre-
gation of information may demonstrate that the investor received most,
if not all, of the substantive information normally found in a prospec-
tus. Depending upon the quality of the information provided, the pro-
moter's due diligence file may permit him to demonstrate that he
satisfied the disclosure requirements of the securities laws.
C. State Exemptions from Registration
Although some states have a registration exemption similar to the
private placement exemption, the number of permitted offerees and the
exact requirements for the exemption vary widely. Many states require
a filing with the state securities division to secure the exemption either
before or after the sale."' No state has a registration exemption pat-
terned after the intrastate exemption. As a consequence, except in the
relative handful of states that have a private placement exemption au-
tomatically available without filing, there is no exemption from state
111. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.03(Q) (Page Supp. 1980), which requires the
filing of Form 3-Q with the Ohio Division of Securities within 60 days after the sale of a security
sold in a private placement.
For a discussion of the blue sky statutory provisions corollary to the federal rules, see Note,
State Exemptions From Securities Regulation Coextensive with SE C Rule 146, 61 CORNELL L.
Rav. 157 (1975).
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registration. If the joint venture interest is a security, its offer and sale
will violate the state registration provisions.
D. Federal Registration of Broker/Dealers
In addition to registration and disclosure requirements, the securities
laws require that the seller of a security either be registered as a bro-
ker/dealer pursuant to section 15112 of the Securities Exchange Act or
be exempt therefrom. There are two primary exemptions from the bro-
ker/dealer registration provisions: the intrastate exemption and the is-
suer exemption. There is not, however, a federal broker/dealer
exemption parallel to the private placement registration exemption.
A broker/dealer exemption exists that parallels the "intrastate" re-
gistration exemption. The rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer which is either a person other
than a natural person or a natural person not associated with a broker or
dealer which is a person other than a natural person (other than such a
broker or dealer whose business is exclusively intrastate and who does not
make use of anyfacility of a national securities exchange). . . to induce or
attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security. . . unless such
broker or dealer is registered in accordance with subsection (b) of this
section. 1 3
If sale of the joint venture interest would qualify for the intrastate ex-
emption from registration and all of the promoter's sales activities are
restricted to residents of a single state, the exemption from bro-
ker/dealer registration may also exist.
The other broker/dealer exemption that may be available is the is-
suer exemption. The Securities Exchange Act defines a broker or
dealer as an individual "engaged in the business" of effecting securities
transactions. Individuals who effect only an isolated sale of a security
are not engaged in the business of selling securities. 1 4 When an issuer
of securities sells its own securities, using only its officers, partners, di-
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976).
113. Id § 78o(a)(I) (emphasis added).
114. Section 3(a)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act provides that the term "broker" means
"any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of
others." 15 U.S.C. § 78c (1976) (emphasis added). Section 3(a)(5) of the Exchange Act provides
that the term "dealer" means "any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities
for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include a bank, or any person
insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own account, but not as part of a regular business." Id
(emphasis added).
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rectors, and/or employees, as the case may be, registration may not be
required, because it is only effecting transactions on its own account.
The individual seller of the security may also be exempt from registra-
tion, because he likewise is not engaged in the business of selling secur-
ities. The sale of joint venture interests by its promoter, who is not
engaged in the business of selling securities, may be exempt from the
federal broker/dealer registration provisions.' 15
E. State Registration of Broker/Dealers
The Uniform Securities Act contains a definitional exemption from
registration as a broker/dealer that is similar to federal law. 1 6 The Act
defines "broker-dealer" as "any person engaged in the business of ef-
fecting transactions in securities for the account of others or for his own
"1117account. 'Broker-dealer' does not include . . . an issuer ....
Certain state statutes contain issuer exemptions that are comparable to
the issuer exemption outlined in proposed SEC regulations. 1 8 For ex-
ample, the Florida Securities Act provides that the term "broker"
means "dealer"" 9 and limits the meaning of the term "dealer."'' 20
Certain states provide an alternative exemption from broker or
dealer registration for persons selling securities in "private place-
115. The issuer exemption, however, may be unavailable to the frequent promoter of joint
ventures if he were deemed a professional real estate syndicator whose regular business is to estab-
lish and sell joint venture interests.
In SEC Rel. No. 34-13195 (Jan. 21, 1977), 17 C.F.R. § 240.3(a)4(l) (1977), the Commission
proposed the adoption of a new rule to the Exchange Act that "would provide a 'safe harbor'
within which persons associated with an issuer would be deemed not to be brokers." Although the
proposed rule has not been adopted, it may help determine whether selling activities constitute the
actions of a "broker." The release stresses that the issuer exemption is not available to profes-
sional real estate syndicators, because they are engaged in the business of selling securities. The
issuer exemption may be unavailable even for the first issue if the individuals effecting the distri-
bution intend to engage in the business of selling securities. Since the promoter of multiple joint
ventures may be engaged in the business of forming and selling such interests, he may derive little
comfort from the existence of the issuer exemption.
116. For limitations of the definitional exemption, see note 115 supra.
117. UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT § 401(c).
118. See note 115 supra.
119. Florida Securities Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.021(4) (West Supp. 1981).
120. Id § 517.021(6) defines "dealer" as
any person associated with an issuer of securities if such person is a bona fide employee
of the issuer who has not participated in the distribution or sale of any securities within
the preceding 12 months and who primarily performs, or is intended to perform at the
end of the distribution, substantial duties for, or on behalf of, the issuer other than in
connection with transactions in securities.
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ments." The Florida Securities Act provides that "the registration re-
quirements of this section [registration of dealers, associated persons,
and investments advisers] shall not apply in a transaction exempted by
Section 517.061(l)-(16) [the private placement exemption]." 121
In states such as Florida, a promoter who forms and sells joint ven-
ture interests in only a single private placement transaction each year
may be exempt from state registration as a broker or dealer, even if the
interests are securities under either an issuer or private placement ex-
emptions. In other states with no private placement exemptions, the
promoter of infrequent joint ventures may rely on the issuer exemp-
tions. The frequent joint venture promoter, however, will have no
exemption.
F. Summary of. State and Federal Securities Laws
The foregoing review indicates that without concluding that the joint
venture interest is a security, even the careful joint venture promoter
cannot ensure compliance with all of the state or federal securities laws
if the joint venture interest is in fact a security. Exemption from regis-
tration of the security and the broker/dealer is sometimes available at
the federal and state level. Exemption from the disclosure require-
ments is never available. Although planning can increase the possibil-
ity that the promoter will comply with the securities laws even without
conceding that the interest is a security, satisfaction of the full sweep of
the disclosure and registration provisions is unlikely. As a conse-
quence, every effort must be expended to structure the joint venture
agreement to maximize the probability that an interest in the joint ven-
ture cannot constitute a security.
G. Drafting a Joint Venture Agreement After Williamson
No matter how the document is drafted, a typical joint venture
agreement will normally satisfy the first three elements of the Howey
test. The investor partners will make an investment in a common en-
terprise with the expectation of making profits. Effective planning and
drafting, however, may eliminate an investor's potential claim that he
anticipated making those profits based on the efforts of others. The
failure to satisfy the fourth element of the Howey test will prevent a
determination that the joint venture interest is a security.
121. Id § 517.12(3).
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The salient theme of Williamson is that a joint venture interest is a
security only when the investor is effectively precluded from exercising
managerial control of the enterprise. To respond to this concern, the
joint venture agreement should provide that all major joint venture de-
cisions require approval of a majority in interest of the venturers. De-
cisions subject to venturer approval should include, at a minimum,
whether to buy, sell, or refinance the venture's property or proceed with
a development plan. The agreement should specify that regular, peri-
odic meetings of all the venturers will be held to receive reports from
the manager and to approve any management decisions implemented
between meetings. Written notification stating when and where meet-
ings will be held with an agenda should be sent to each investor. Accu-
rate minutes of the meetings, reflecting discussions and votes on
important issues, should be maintained.
Counsel for real estate developers will readily recognize the difficulty
of achieving compliance with the procedures outlined above. Including
such provisions in the joint venture agreement, however, should evince
the promoter's intention of establishing an enterprise to be managed by
its partners. If the investor is unable, unwilling, or uninterested in at-
tending meetings or receiving reports, his failure to do so represents a
deliberate choice to decline managerial control. One inescapable con-
clusion from Williamson and the Eighth and Tenth Circuit cases upon
which it relied is that an investor's decision to play a passive role when
an active role is possible does not convert a nonsecurity interest into a
security." '2 As the Williamson court stated, "[a]n investor who is of-
fered an interest in a general partnership or joint venture should be on
notice, therefore, that his ownership rights are significant, and that the
federal securities acts will not protect him from a mere failure to exer-
cise his rights."'"
The second element of the Williamson test emphasizes that an inves-
tor who has the ability to exercise his managerial power does not
purchase a security. The promoter's investigation of each investor
should document the investor's capabilities on the basis of his educa-
tional and business background. The investor should represent that he
is financially and/or educationally sophisticated and that it is his pres-
ent intention to actively exercise his management powers.
122. See note 86 supra.
123. 645 F.2d at 422.
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If the promoter's investigation reveals that the potential investor is
patently incapable of exercising such control, serious consideration
should be given to excluding the investor as a joint venture partner. An
alternative response to excluding an unsophisticated investor may be to
permit the investor to designate a sophisticated agent. The agent could
investigate the joint venture, vote on behalf of the investor, and attend
joint venture meetings. The promoter may thus create a joint venture
analog to the offeree representative concept of Rule 146.124 The pres-
ence of an investment advisor may rehabilitate the investor as an ap-
propriate partner by providing him with the financial sophistication
and ability to exercise control otherwise lacking. Although this concept
is not suggested in Williamson, it seems responsive to the court's princi-
pal concerns.
The third element of the Williamson test discusses the investor's de-
pendence upon the promoter. In many respects, it is difficult to elimi-
nate such dependence if in fact the promoter has unique talents. A real
estate developer is generally able to form joint ventures, either with
institutional or individual investors, precisely because his prior per-
formance demonstrates exceptional talent. Although those talents may
not be unique in the sense that they are not literally irreplaceable, they
are talents not widely available or easily acquirable. There are fewer
truly gifted real estate developers than there are investors with funds.
Because it may not be possible to respond to the "unique" aspects of
managerial control, the joint venture agreement should squarely at-
tempt to rebut the alternative formulation under the third element of
the Williamson test, namely, that the manager is irreplaceable. The
agreement should provide mechanics delineating when and how the
promoter/manager may be replaced and the procedure for selecting a
new manager. Removal may be permitted only if the manager fails to
achieve certain development goals on time or specified levels of operat-
ing income. An alternative, based on the Eighth Circuit cases discussed
in Williamson,125 is to limit to a fixed time period the pro-
moter/manager's right to manage. After the expiration of the period,
the appointment of a manager would be periodically determined by all
venture partners. By providing mechanics for removal in the first ap-
proach and a time limitation in the second, the promoter may refute an
124. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(a)(1) (1981).
125. See note 86 supra.
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argument that the investor is dependent upon an irreplaceable
manager.
In practice, many joint venture promoters would not want to partici-
pate in a venture they no longer manage. The agreement should there-
fore permit the promoter to sell his interest to the venture and/or its
partners at a price and terms based on a specific formula if he is re-
placed as manager. The obvious danger of this approach is the possi-
bility that the buy-out provisions will be found to be so prohibitive that
they cannot be exercised. Such a finding would leave the analysis
where it began, that is, that the manager is irreplaceable.
V. CONCLUSION
Investment contract analysis is necessarily conducted on a transac-
tion by transaction basis. Uncertain theory is applied to inherently
unique facts. The Williamson test, although somewhat ambiguous and
not above criticism, provides some basis for joint venture promoters
and their counsel to design an interest that is not a security. By re-
sponding to the guidelines, restricting offers to sophisticated investors,
and preserving meaningful management power for such investors, a
joint venture promoter can successfully steer the real estate securities
course between Scylla and Charybdis.
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